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RAMAPHOSA and MEYER in BELFAST 
The South African Experience: 
How the New South Africa was Negotiated 
The Europa Hotel 
Belfast 
28 June 1996 
The public lecture given by Cyril Ramaphosa and RoelfMeyer at the Europa Hotel in Belfast on 28 
June 1996 was held under the auspices of The Irish Association. The sponsors are grateful to the 
Association for their unstinting support and the organization it provided to ensure the success of the 
event. The sponsors would especially like to acknowledge the contributions of Professor Bernard 
Cullen, President of the Association and Ms. Barbara FitzGerald. 
As one ofthe co-sponsors ofthe event, the John W. McCormack Institute ofPublic Affairs at the 
University ofMassachusetts Boston would also like to single out the contribution of the lecture's 
other co-sponsor, Independent Newspapers Inc. and its chairperson, Dr. A. J. F. O'Reilly whose 
generous financial support made the lecture possible. 
Our most indebtedness, of course, is to Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer who made the long, 
exhausting trip from South Africa to Belfast, because they believe that the lessons of the South 
African experience should be shared with other countries tom apart by conflict. They came not to 
offer their "solution" to the Northern Ireland conflict or to put themselves forward as mediators of 
some sort but simply to share with the people ofNorthem Ireland with whom they empathize how 
they did it in South Africa and in the belief that common principles are germane to a successful 
negotiating process and are applicable, with the modifications necessary to take account of local 
circumstances, to all conflicts in deeply divided societies. 
INTRODUCTION 
For a time it was known as the "Cyril and Roelf Show," that extraordinary period between June 1992 
and November 1993 when Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and RoelfMeyer, Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the National Party government, were 
the sole channels of communication between their respective parties following the termination of 
contact between the two in the aftermath of the Boipatong massacre. 1 
Tension in the country was at a fever-pitch; the violence that had enveloped the country since August 
1990 was increasing exponentially; hardly a day went by without some horrific incident of slaughter 
further numbing the mind of a country already deep in the throes of violence-induced trauma. 
The ANC angrily denounced the government for being behind the violence, for either implicitly or 
explicitly, not only condoning but surreptitiously facilitating attacks on ANC activists and supporters, 
for being a more-than approving accomplice to the violence of Inkatha. 2 In the townships, frightened 
residents turned on the ANC accusing it ofhaving abandoned them to the marauding assaults of Zulu 
hostel-dwellers in their vicinity. It appeared to the masses that the ANC's engagement in talks in the 
sedate chambers of the World Trade Center with the National Party, the brutal oppressor who had 
enslaved them for decades, depriving them of every basic human right, of every last vestige of their 
humanity had taken precedence over the security of its own constituency, sandwiched, sardine-like, 
into squalid townships and even more squalid squatters' camps. 
De Klerk, Mandela declared, was no longer a man of integrity but party to a carefully constructed 
plan to drag out negotiations, while using state-manipulated violence to destroy the credibility of the 
ANC in the black community, undermining its standing among its supporters who were the victims 
of its apparent powerlessness to protect them from the violence engulfing their lives. The peace 
process, so enthusiastically hailed when the ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela released in 
February 1990, had come to a jarring halt; and the dream of a new South Africa that would usher in 
an era of racial harmony and equality for all had evaporated in the miasma of murder and rampant 
lawlessness that stifled the voices calling for restraint and reconciliation and poisoned the well of 
goodwill that had existed, albeit with its ups and downs, for the better part of two years. 
In interviews I have conducted since 1990 with Cyril Ramaphosa and RoelfMeyer, both stress that 
the key to the transformation in their relationship was the mutual personal trust they developed during 
the three months of tough, uncompromising negotiations they engaged in on a one-on-one basis after 
the Boipatong massacre that resulted in the Record of Understanding the ANC and the NP put their 
signatures to in September 1992.3 The Record of Understanding changed the focus of the subsequent 
multiparty negotiations and charted the course for an eventual settlement. They stress, too, the 
fiiendship they forged as the result oflong, exhausting and exhaustive hours of conversation and the 
closeness that the clandestine meetings between them imposed; the respect they developed for each 
other as they wrestled with their different aspirations, their often-at-odds visions of the future; the 
tenacity tempered with tolerance they brought to their deliberations; the intellectual competition, at 
once ruthless and restrained, they had to master when power and the questions of who will wield it 
and how have to be thrashed out and the players must employ the virtuosity of the maestro, the 
stamina of the chess player, the cunning of the poker-shark, the charm of the con man, and the 
common sense of the man-in-the-street; their mutual appreciation of the fact that while both acted 
on behalf of their respective constituencies, both also sought the common ground that would unite 
their constituencies and put the good of all South Africans above the parochial concerns of particular 
interest groups. 
"RoelfMeyer and I are friends," Cyril Ramaphosa said, addressing graduating students, their parents 
and friends at the University ofMassachusetts Boston on 2 June 1993, when both he and RoelfMeyer 
were joint commencement speakers and recipients of honorary degrees, "although we have deep 
political differences. But we will solve them and our friendship will outlive our differences." 
Resolve them they did, because they had to. In the absence of alternatives and the commitment on 
the part ofboth the ANC and the NP to a negotiated settlement, they made the tough and sometimes 
unpalatable compromises that resulted, in their own words, in a" win-win" situation. Compromise, 
they both came to understand was not only a necessary but the one indispensable ingredient of a 
successful negotiating process; and the willingness to compromise, they also came to understand, 
could only reveal itself when the parties to the compromise trusted and respected each other. In the 
end, Ramaphosa and Meyer were able to imbue their parties, once the most bitter and implacable of 
enemies, with the trust they had carefully, if warily, nurtured. The rest, as they say is history, but not 
history without pain, detours, setbacks, and rivers ofblood in which the hopes and dreams of many 
would drown. But they pushed on because they had to; there was no going back to the "old" ways. 
For both blacks and whites the waiting was over. 
In the aftermath of the signing ofthe Record of Understanding, key members of the SAG and the 
ANC cemented their relationship at two bosberaad meetings in December 1993 and January 1994. 
For four days they lived together, ate and drank and talked together, and got to a better 
understanding of each other in the most casual and unceremonious of circumstances. In four days, 
they stepped gingerly, and not without apprehension, across the bridges of three centuries; the 
informal ambience broke down formal barriers; old animosities were seen in new and less hostile 
lights; the rigid stereotyping that both sides had engaged in began to abate, and were slowly replaced 
by a new and respectful awareness of each other as individuals, which, even if not fully defined or 
clearly understood, offered the room for rapprochement if not actual friendship. 
Of course, with the passage of time and the emergence of the second-guessers, the sideline players 
who take to the field once the game is over, accomplishment is usually devalued. The extent of the 
achievement in South Africa is ineluctably becoming shrouded in the cobwebs of history. It is 
fashionable to treat the radical political transformation that occurred as an inevitability whose time 
had come, not as the product of a negotiated settlement, an outcome only made possible when the 
protagonists separately and together recognized that while neither could defeat the other, neither 
could win an outright victory. 
It is a thought that should concentrate minds in Northern Ireland. 
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It is also fashionable to scoff at comparisons between the conflicts in South Africa and Northern 
Ireland. Indeed, to assert that the two situations are the same would be deserving of such scoffing. 
But that is not to say that there are not similarities the two share that can shed light on the nature of 
the conflict in each, and it certainly does not say that the infrastructure and processes of negotiation 
that were developed and used in South Africa are not of relevance to Northern Ireland. 
In one sense, it is true that direct comparisons between the conflicts in the two countries can be 
misleading and specious; in another sense, however, it is also true that the two conflicts have much 
m common. 
Both countries share common structural characteristics typical of divided societies. Both wrestle with 
questions of tradition, culture and identity. The dominant community ( Protestants in Northern 
Ireland and until recently Afrikaners in South Africa,) comes from settler populations, and the 
subordinate community (Catholics in Northern Ireland and until recently Blacks in South Africa,) is 
indigenous. In both cases the dominant community asserts an equal claim to the land. Afrikaners 
trace their origins to a trading post their forebears established in Table Bay in 1652; Protestants trace 
their roots to the plantations of Ulster in 1607. In neither case is there a "mother country" to which 
descendants of the original settlers can return. White South Africans saw South Africa as a white 
country for a white people; Northern Ireland Protestants saw Northern Ireland as a "Protestant state 
for a Protestant people," to use the blunt words of the province's first prime minister, Sir James 
Craig. South Afiican blacks rejected the legitimacy of the South Afiican state; many Northern Ireland 
Catholics reject the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state. Both conflicts, therefore, have 
overlapping commonalities that intersect on questions of ownership, territory, sovereignty, legitimacy, 
identity, and ethnicity. 
Both countries have demographic anomalies. In South Africa, the minority white population of 17 
per cent dominated the black population; and in Northern Ireland, at least until the British government 
abolished the Stormont Parliament in 1972, the Protestant population of 65 per cent dominated 
Catholics. In both cases, the dominant group saw itself as being superior to the other - even marginal 
members of groups that perceive themselves as being superior derive status from belonging to their 
particular group. When that marginal status is threatened, they react, often violently, to protect their 
positions. Hence in Northern Ireland, the fears of right-wing working-class Protestants who support 
Loyalist paramilitaries, and in South Africa the fears of marginal whites who flocked to the 
Conservative Party and even more right-leaning organizations. One of the more brushed aside lessons 
of history is that the "outs" in the "in"groups always want to preserve the status quo. 
But what defines the crucial difference between the two conflicts are the measures adopted by the 
dominant communities in both to protect their power. In South Africa the Afrikaner state 
implemented the racial policies of apartheid and separate development, policies that were enforced 
with a methodical and brute ruthlessness, an inhumanity that reduced blacks to being non-persons, 
forcing the resettlement of millions, destroying family life and entire communities and undermining 
their social fabric. Blacks were totally disenfranchised, denied any expression of their aspirations; 
their existence itself became a matter of questionable legality. In Northern Ireland, during the 50 
years ofProtestant domination, Catholics were systematically discriminated against in public housing, 
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government and employment; they had no say in parliament insofar as they were a permanent minority 
with no legal safeguards to protect them against the often-capricious and sometimes cruel will of the 
majority; they were unable to express their Irishness, their sense of identity; and they, too, were 
denied any expression oftheir aspirations. 
But neither the level of subordination Catholics had to endure nor the harshness of the dominant 
regime ever reached the level of oppression the Afrikaner regime imposed in South Africa. To argue, 
therefore, that the situation of Catholics in Northern Ireland and South Mrican blacks is somehow 
analogous would be to trivialize the enormous suffering South Mrica's blacks have endured. 
Apartheid was evil. Period. The kinds of majority discrimination practiced and enforced by 
Protestants in Northern Ireland were repulsive and wrong. 
It is, therefore, of more than passing interest to witness a process of genuine reconciliation underway 
in South Africa. Despite the barbarous treatment ofblacks meted out by racist whites, there are no 
vengeful demands for retribution on a scale commensurate with the suffering inflicted by whites. In 
Northern Ireland, on the other hand, all parties cling recalcitrantly to what's left ofthe integrity of 
their ancient quarrel. 
Hence the visit of Ramaphosa and Meyer to Belfast, not to proscribe but to share, to bear witness, 
as it were, to their own experience that even in the most untractable of conflicts there are common 
denominators to the processes that must be created, the structures that must be put in place, the 
procedural principles that must be followed, the compromises that must be assented to, the trade-off's 
that must be condoned, and above all the trust that must be cultivated and blossom before 
negotiations can come to fruition, and a settlement, no doubt as flawed as the flawed individuals who 
put its fragile parts together, is agreed. 
The most salient of these common denominators as they would apply to Northern Ireland would 
appear to be: 
• There should be transparency and openness in the negotiating process. To whatever extent 
is possible, the public should be made part of the process, so that when obstacles emerge, and 
they will, they can be discussed and clarified in the public domain. On no account should an 
impression be conveyed that deals are being done behind closed doors. 
• Every party must recognize, as must both governments, that different communities use 
language in different ways, and that structures must be put in place that anticipate and defuse 
the misunderstandings that will arise because of these differences. 
• Progress only comes when negotiating parties learn to start trusting each other. Trust is a 
learned behavior. When one party addresses another, especially in bilaterals, it must do so 
with particular sensitivity to the other party's politics and the difficulties it may be having with 
its own community - or even within the party's own ranks. Parties must put themselves in 
the shoes of their protagonists. They must help their protagonists to bring their communities 
with them. In the end, successful negotiations are not so much about bringing your 
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community along with you, as helping your protagonists bring their communities along with 
them. Respect for the others' positions is germane to the whole process. 
• The level of trust that develops among negotiators is a function of their ability to 
communicate, which, in tum, requires them to develop a common vocabulary, a sufficiency 
of consensus, and a degree of personal empathy with the situations their counterparts face and 
the difficulties they have to deal with. 
• If political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust and respect, tolerance of others, and a 
willingness to compromise must exist at all levels. In this regard, where there is a transparent 
absence oftrust on each side of the divide, due in part to ingrained cultural differences with 
regard to language and process - some of which have their origins competing claims to 
legitimacy that developed over the centuries - a negotiating process that stipulates that 
"nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" sets up a situation more like a poker table than 
a negotiating table. 
• The formula that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, " discourages openness and 
risk-taking, and encourages every side to play their cards close to their chests, making it 
difficult to create the ambience in which accommodation emerges. 
• Party leaders should not act as their party's chief negotiator. Their function is to appoint 
negotiators who act on their behalf Negotiators are given a mandate by their parties. It is 
the function of negotiators to negotiate away their mandates in their quest for compromise 
and accommodation. It is the function of party leaders to "sell" their negotiators' 
compromises to their parties and constituents. It is also the function of the party leader to 
replace negotiators who fail to present the party's mandate in the most propitious light. If 
party leaders act as their own negotiators, this may prove to be an exceedingly difficult chore. 
• At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent risk of compromise; indeed, 
compromise is the essential ingredient of negotiations, without which there can be no 
negotiations. Each compromise is a building block. As parties grow to trust each other and 
move from one compromise to the next, with concessions, though difficult, being made on 
all sides, every party becomes invested in the process, each develops a stake in seeing the 
other succeed, a sum of mutual investments develops, which provides the cushion when it 
comes to the crunch issues. 
• The concept of "sufficient consensus" rather than being defined in an arbitary, arithmetical 
way should be defined more flexibly as that level of consensus that allows the process to 
move on to the next stage or does not result in the process breaking down. 
• Time tables are imperative. They concentrate minds and force participants to meet deadlines 
encouraging compromise, especially when progress has been made on a number of fronts, or 
risking the loss of progress made up to that point. 
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• All parties must feel an equal ownership in the process. They must regard the process as 
being theirs, the result of their deliberations and agreements, that the governments are parties 
to the process, not the owners of it. To the extent that the Northern Ireland parties feel 
otherwise, the prospects for progress are dim. 
I . See footnote# 18 
2. See footnote #8 
3. See footnote #I 9 
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The South African Experience: How the New South Africa was Negotiated 
BERNARD CULLEN: Ladies and gentlemen, you're all very welcome. I'll begin with apologizing 
for the delay in starting. As I'm sure you can well imagine, our two guests from South Africa have 
been in great demand in the few hours that they are spending with us. They have been in discussions 
with representatives from the local political parties and other groups, and I hope you understand why 
we're a bit late in getting started. 
For those of you who are visitors, I'm Bernard Cullen. I'm the current President of the Irish 
Association. I' d like to give a warm welcome to all members of the association who are here this 
evening; but especially I would like to extend a very warm welcome to those of you who are not yet 
members. 
A more special word of welcome to Padraigh O'Malley, who is from the Center for Democracy and 
Development at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of 
Massachusetts Boston. The Institute is one of the sponsors of this evening's lecture. 
We all know Padraigh through his writings on Northern Ireland, and through his many visits to 
Belfast. And also a word of welcome to Margery O'Donnell, also from the Center, who has done so 
much in helping to organize this evening's event. We are deeply indebted to them both. 
Finally, but most especially, the warmest welcome of all to our two special guests from South Africa, 
Cyril Ramaphosa and RoelfMeyer. 
I would be very surprised if they had ever heard of the Irish Association. So a few words about us. 
The Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations, to give it its full, and somewhat 
grandiose title, was founded in 1938 by Major General Hugh Montgomery, a Unionist from County 
Tyrone, out of his concern that the two parts of Ireland were drifting further and further apart 
because of mutual distrust and suspicion. Today the Association has members on all sides of the 
political spectrum, of many religions and of none, living in both parts of Ireland. And in that regard, 
I'm very pleased to welcome many of our members, who have traveled from the Republic for this 
meeting. 
We all share the conviction that no border, be it political, cultural or psychological should prevent 
us from talking to each other, and listening to each other. And especially talking and listening to 
those with whom we have profound political and religious disagreements. 
There is no point in talking just to people who agree with us, or with whom we agree. The Irish 
Association has no political platform. But we seek to provide a platform for others to share with us 
their ideas, their analyses, their grievances, and their aspirations. 
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So the Irish Association really is a talking shop, but a talking shop with the express aim of fostering 
dialogue and mutual understanding, especially on those sensitive issues that divide us most deeply. 
Today we are delighted and honored to welcome two men who have lived most of their lives in a 
society deeply divided by culture and more particularly by race, who somehow found the inner 
strength to enter into a genuine dialogue, and who were determined that dialogue would end in 
political accommodation. 
They generously agreed to make the long journey from South Africa to Northern Ireland, not to tell 
us how we should conduct our affairs and find a way out of our current political impasse, but to share 
with us their reflections on their own experiences and how they managed to strike a deal. 
Against all the odds, that deal has proved to be remarkably durable. I can't believe that we in 
Northern Ireland don't have an enormous amount to learn from them. If we have the courage and 
determination to persevere, when the obstacles to understanding and accommodation seem 
insurmountable, we, too, can follow in their path and apply the lessons of their experiences to our 
own situation. 
Gentlemen, you are both very welcome. [applause.] 
We, of course, have followed the South African process of accommodation with great interest, and 
those of us interested in public affairs have, invariably, asked ourselves, "How did they manage to do 
it?" It's usually couched in a kind of exasperated, "How the hell have they done it in South Africa?" 
And, of course, many people then respond by puffing their chests and saying, "Oh, well, their hatreds 
only go back two or three hundred years. Nothing like ours." But I'm sure we will learn from your 
sharing your experience with us. 
The format for this evening's program is as follows. I'll make brief introductions of the two speakers. 
They will speak for about 15 minutes each, and then the floor will be yours for a seminar and for your 
questions and contributions. 
The first speaker will be Mr. Cyril Rarnaphosa. Cyril Rarnaphosa was hom in Johannesburg in 1952. 
He attended high school in Soweto and later in the North Transvaal. He became a student at the 
University ofthe North where he became involved in student politics. In 1974 he was detained for 
11 months under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, spending the entire period in solitary confinement. 
He was detained again in 1976. On his release he continued his studies, earned his degree, and 
proceeded to qualify as a lawyer. 
He joined the Council of Unions of South Africa as an adviser in its legal department in 1981, and 
in December, 1982, he became the first General Secretary of the National Union of Mine Workers, 
occupying this post until July, 1991. 
In 1991 Cyril Ramaphosa was elected Secretary General ofthe African National Congress (ANC), 
and in this capacity became head of the Negotiations Committee of the AN C. In 1994 he was a 
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member ofthe Management Committee ofthe Transitional Executive Council. In May 1994, after 
the first post-apartheid elections conducted on the basis of one-person-one vote, he became a member 
of Parliament, and chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly which had the formidable task of 
writing the country's final constitution. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great privilege to welcome 
and to invite to speak to us, Cyril Ramaphosa. [applause.] 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to thank you for inviting me 
and RoelfMeyer to be here to share some thoughts with you. 
I'd like to make a correction, Mr. Chairman. You assert that we are not here to tell you how to do 
it - how to resolve your problems. On the contrary, we are here to tell you how you should do it. 
We have all the answers that have been eluding you for all these years. [laughter.] 
And in my hand I hold a document, which is the blueprint. And I hand it over to you. [laughter.] 
That document reads, "You must have the courage to do it." [applause.] 
Mr. Chairman, it is with much gratitude and with some trepidation that I accepted the invitation to 
be here. It is an honor for me to be among you. For quite a long time I have wanted to come to 
Belfast, and to find out for myself what is happening. 
At the same time, I'm rather anxious about representing accurately the complexities of our own 
situation, the transition process in South Africa. From the time we arrived tills morning from South 
Africa, we have been meeting with representatives of various political parties, and we have been 
stressing that all we can do, all we can talk about is to explain how we did it. 
How we brought the apartheid conflict to an end. More than that, we cannot do. Back in the days 
of apartheid in our country, the struggle for democracy reached much significant support from 
various parts of the world. We are always mindful of the debt that we owe the people of this region 
-for the support that they gave to our struggle, which has brought us to where we are today. From 
the depth of my heart I'm pleased to say "thank you," to all of you here in Belfast. You supported 
our struggle in ways that you couldn't ever imagine. And we thank you for that too - for helping to 
bring about the new South Africa we are now living in. 
While we faced many of the typical problems that are associated with achieving a negotiated 
settlement, South Afiica's experience was unique in many ways, not only in terms of the problems we 
faced but also in the way that we chose to tackle those problems. 
So, too, is the situation here unique. While you might learn some lessons from the experiences of 
others, ultimately you will have to find for yourselves the processes and the solutions that suit your 
own situation. 
South Africa was the last country on the African continent to be liberated from colonialism and 
minority rule. As such, we had a number of experiences we could draw on. You could say we had 
a continent full of experiences from which we could learn. The negotiated settlements that were 
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achieved in Zimbabwe in 1980 and in Namibia in 1989 were particularly instructive to us. 1 
South Mrica's own negotiated settlement began in August 1989, when the Organization of Mrican 
Unity (OAU) produced what is now called the Harare Declaration. 2 The declaration provided an 
outline for a peaceful settlement in South Africa. 3 Prior to that the negotiations process had 
effectively been started by Nelson Mandela himself who began to engage in discussions with the 
National Party government in 1985 while he was still in prison; indeed he continued to engage in 
these discussions for six years before he was released from prison. 4 However, a few months after the 
Harare Declaration was adopted, the first preconditions to genuine negotiations were met when the 
'In 1980, after almost twenty years of civil war, elections were held pursuant to the Lanchester House Accords. 
Within weeks of the elections, Great Britain granted independence to Zimbabwe, although the terms of the Lancaster House 
Accords restricted the govenunent's ability to amend certain provisions of the constitution for a period often years. In 1990, 
Namibia achieved independence from South Africa after 30 years of civil war. The United Nations played a critical role in 
the Namibian transition, monitoring the cease fire between the liberation forces and South Africa, and then supervising the 
conduct of the November 1989 Namibian elections, which were administered by South Africa. Once installed, the Assembly 
adopted a constitution, which has been hailed as among the most democratic in Southern Afiica. Fallowing independence, 
the constituent Assembly became the country's first National Assembly. 
2 The Declaration was drafted by the ANC and endorsed by the OAU. See Declaration of the OA U Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Southern Africa on the Question ofS'outh Africa. Harare, Zimbabwe, 21 August 1989. 
'1he Declaration set out a number of requirements that the South African government would have to meet before 
negotiations could get under way: a) the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees without any restrictions 
being placed on them: b) the lifting of all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons; 
c) the removal of all troops from the townships; d) an end to the State of Emergency and the repeal of all legislation, such 
as and including the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and e) an end to all political trials and 
political executions. The government countered with demands that the ANC call a halt to its campaign of violence. These 
two sets of demands set the agenda for the early meetings between the ANC and the government. 
4 In 1985, Nelson Mandela had written Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice, asking him for a meeting to discuss 
talks between the ANC and the government. In November 1985, CoeL~e visited Mandela when Mandela was in hospital 
recovering from surgery for an enlarged prostate gland. Later that year, Mandela met Coetsee at the latter's residence in 
Cape Town. In 1987, a conunittee of senior government officials, headed by Coetsee, was set up by PW Botha, the State 
President, to hold private meetings with Mandela. On 5 July 1989, Mandela met with Botha at the state president's office 
in Cape Town. Secret meetings between Mandela and the committee lasted for four years and culminated in the release of 
Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990. Regarding his decision to try and open talks with the government, 
Mandela writes in his autobiography that "I choose to tell no one of what I was about to do. Not my colleagues upstairs 
{in Pollsmoor prison, to which he and three of his colleagues had heen transferred to from Rohhen Island in I985} or 
those in Lusaka. I knew my colleagues upstairs would condemn my proposal, and that would kill my initiative he fore it 
was horn. There are times a leader must move ahead o[his flock. ~o of/in a new direction. confident that he is leadin~ 
his people the rj~ht way." [Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Boston: Little Brown 1994)]. In August 1996, 
President Mandela feted five former top white officials in the old apartheid National Party govemment at a dinner at his 
official residence. At the dllmer were fom1er intelligence service officials Niel Bernard and Mike Louw, former Minister of 
Justice Kobie Coetsee, former Secretary of Justice Fanie van der Merwe and General Willem Willemse, a former 
conmlissioner of prisons. "One o[the ironies o[histmy is that people who have worked hard to hrin~ about transformation 
are sometimes for~otten. " Mandela said, introducing the five. "Others, because o[positions thev held. are re~arded as 
the architects [o[chan~el. These men are the real architects ... Others climbed on the handwa~on. These are the miracle 
!JW1." With Mr. Bernard, forn1er Director General of the National Intelligence Service(N1S), at his side, President Mandela 
said: "Barnard was head of national intelliF;ence and [or me to sit down and discuss anv issue with him was reallv 
revoltinf:. I re~arded him as more o[an enemy than the whole National Party put tof:ether." Tuming to shake Bernard's 
hand, he said: "I am very ~rate(ul to have the opportunitv to thank you. " [The Argus 3/4 August 1996] 
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ANC and all other banned organizations were unbanned, and political prisoners were released, 
including Nelson Mandela. 
In a sense we have just finished that process. It was a very long and arduous process, which took the 
better part of six years. On May 8 the Constitutional Assembly, elected in 1994 in our first 
democratic elections, finalized South Africa's new constitution. It was an historic moment as the 490 
members voted by more than two-thirds majority to approve South Africa's first fully democratic 
constitution - the constitution by which South Mrica will be governed, hopefully for generations to 
come. 
The constitution has been described as the birth certificate of a new nation, as the document that 
defines its being and shapes its destiny. It is a document that has effectively been in the making for 
over 300 years. 
Some of us, Roelf and myself among them, were privileged to have been part of the process that 
brought to an end a 300 year history of exploitation and oppression. The constitution is a document 
that forbids for all time the oppression of one South Mrican by another. Most importantly, it is a 
document, which all South Africans, regardless of their background, their race, their religion or 
political affiliation can call their own. 
So how did we get, in the space of six short years, from a repressive apartheid state to a thriving 
democracy? The starting point for the Mrican National Congress was that as the ANC, it bore the 
historic responsibility ofbringing apartheid to an end. We believe that no other organization in South 
Africa had this mission. The ANC bore this mission from the time it was formed in 1912, and since 
then the Mrican National Congress had sought to engage successive white governments in 
negotiations to achieve basic human rights for all South Mricans. 
For the greater part of this century, the ANC was the leading force in the struggle to bring an end to 
racial tyranny, to racial oppression, to intolerance and human rights abuses. Even when the ANC 
embarked on arms struggle in 1961, we continued to agitate for a negotiated settlement in South 
Mrica. 5 
5 
"For fifty years, the ANC had treated nonviolence as a core principle, beyond guestion or debate." writes 
Nelson Mandela in his autobiography. The decision to resort to anned resistance to the South Atncan govenunent which 
had legislated and implemented the pillars of apmiheid in the 1950s and early 1960s, including the requirement that Blacks 
carry at all times the notorious P:L.:;s Book was taken, according to Mandel a, because "the state had given us no alternative. " 
The ANC' s anny was named Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) - or MK for short. The anny was "a separate and 
independent organ, linked to the ANC and under the control of the ASNC. but fundamentally autonomous," writes 
Mandela :"[I} was authorized to go head andfonn a new military organization, separate from the ANC. The policy of 
the ANC would still be that of nonviolence. I was authorized to join with whomever I wanted to or needed to create this 
organization and would not be subject to the direct control of the mother organization. " For an account of the debate 
within the ANC that led to the founding of the MK, see Mandela, op. cit. For 25 years, Umkhonto restricted its activities 
to attacks on military targets, but on the 25th anniversary of its founding, it issued a statement saying that henceforth civilians 
would find themselves caught in the crossfire, since "our history has taught us that people's power cannot come through 
a change of heart from our mlers. " See Steven Friedman [ ed] The long Journey: S'outh Africa's quest for a negotiated 
settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993). From 1987, ANC thinking began to move more and more in the direction 
of a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, the rhetotic of the "seizure of power" continued to exercise considerable emotional 
and p:-.-ychological impact. 
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Towards the end of the 1980s, we intensified our efforts for political negotiations in the belief that 
international and national events would necessitate a negotiated peace sooner rather than later. 
Hence the Harare Declaration, and the ANC's willingness to engage in negotiations with the then 
Nationalist Party (NP) government. 
The ANC returned to South Africa in 1990 with a number of strengths. During its years in exile, it 
had established a worldwide anti-apartheid movement that had been the driving force behind 
comprehensive economic, military and cultural sanctions. 
The world was against apartheid. The world was keenly interested in a peaceful solution to the South 
Africa conflict. The ANC also had the support of the overwhelming majority of South Mricans who 
had been effectively mobilized through community organizations to resist the apartheid government. 
The ANC's underground structures were still in place, and so was its military capacity. Taken 
together, these strengths made the ANC a force to be reckoned with. 
This is not to say the ANC did not have its share of weaknesses. For one thing, the ANC's return 
from exile was a massive logistical operation that required the deployment of massive human and 
other resources. The ANC did not, for instance, command or even have access to the vast machinery 
of the state, which the National Party did. It didn't have a military capacity, which could match that 
of the National Party, nor did it have access to the machinery that could police the transition. 
The National Party itself had a number of weaknesses. In the eyes of the world and the majority of 
South Africans, the National Party had no legitimacy. Apartheid had made the country virtually 
ungovernable. The economy was in a downward spiral, threatening the country with a socio-
economic collapse. There was pressure, even from among the National Party's traditional supporters 
both inside and outside the country, to reach a settlement. 
Even though the ANC and the National Party were on opposite sides of the apartheid divide, there 
was sufficient sense on each to realize that as much as their respective visions of South Mrica were 
different the country's ultimate survival depended on the two of them reaching a settlement. 
Looking back, I suppose the key motivation for the ANC to engage the National Party in an effort 
to achieve a negotiated settlement was the realization that a settlement would be imposed on us, if 
we didn't make use of the opportunity that we had. The ANC was acutely aware of efforts in many 
quarters in the world that were being taken to finally resolve the apartheid question. If the need had 
arisen, the necessary measures could have been implemented by international institutions. 
The Commonwealth had tried by sending a mission to South Mrica that was aborted 6 A number of 
6 Mandela' s 27 years of incarceration can he broken down into three phases. At Rohhen Island from May 1963 
to April 1982; with a small selected group of the ANC leadership at Pollsmoor, on the outskirts of Cape To~n, from April 
1982 to November 1985; at PolbmcxJr in his own accommodations from November 1985 to February 1990. A seven 
member Eminent Persons Group (EPG) from the Commonwealth arrived in South Africa in early 1986 under the co-
chairmanship of Malcolm Frazer, tormer prime minister of Australia and Gen. Olusegun Ohasanjo, the former military ruler 
of Nigeria who had returned the cotmtry to civilian rule in 1979. The EPG met with Mandel a on two occasions at Pollsmoor. 
However, after the group drew up a "possible negotiating concept" paper which included provisions for the release of 
political prisoners, the unhanning of the ANC and other hlack organizations, the suspension of the ANC' s anned struggle 
and of the government's violence against blacks, and the start of all-party negotiations, the government more or less 
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events taking place beyond South Africa's borders indicated a growing impetus throughout the world 
for the resolution of conflict. In our own part of the world, we had seen the resolution of protracted 
civil wars in both Angola and Mozambique. We had witnessed remarkable progress in peace 
initiatives in the Middle East. The ANC had the choice of getting on board and helping to steer the 
negotiations' bus, or being strapped to its back and going wherever negotiations took us. 
While the ANC and the NP were the two principal forces in South Africa at the time, both recognized 
that there were a number of other players in the South African arena who needed to be party to any 
settlement. When the negotiations process began with bilateral meetings between the ANC and the 
government, the ANC always insisted that negotiations should involve all South Mrican political 
parties. 
This led to the formation in December 1991 of the Convention for a Democratic South Mrica, also 
known as CODESA. 7 The starting point for CODESA was the need to establish a common, albeit 
broad, vision of what needed to be achieved in South Africa. 
The Declaration of Intent, which was adopted by all parties at CODES A, except for the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP)8 laid the basis for an all inclusive and binding negotiation process. 9 
sabotaged the EPG mission when it canied out a series of predawn raids on supposed ANC bases in Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
and Botswana on 19 May 1986, and declared a State of Emergency. The EPG immediately tenninated its mission. 
7 CODESA was convened I December 1991. Nineteen political parties including the govenunents of the 
homelands and the independent states (TBVC), the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), the National Party 
(NP), the South African govemment, the Democratic Pruty (DP), the Labour Pmty (exclusively Coloreds), Solidmity 
(exclusively Indians) ru1d the Inkatha Freedom Pruty (IFP) participated. The major parties who rentSed to participate were 
the Conservative Party (CP), the Pan Afiicanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO). 
8 Inkatha emerged from Inkatha yakwa Zulu, a cultural organization established by the Zulu king Soloman ka 
Dinuzulu, in 1928. After a few years it cea..o;;ed to he active. In 1975, ChiefMangosutho Buthelezi, Chief Minister to the Zulu 
king, Goodwill Zwelithini, and ruler of the KwaZulu homeland, revived the movement which claimed to have upwards of 
I. 5 million members by the beginning of the 1990s. During the 1970s, Buthelezi was a symbol of black resistance to 
apartheid and was held in high esteem in the intemational community. He refused to negotiate with the South Afiican 
government (SAG) until Mandela was released and would not accept "independence" for KwaZulu, despite the SAG's best 
efforts to saddle him with it. In 1978/' 79, Inkatha and the ANC enjoyed a remarkably close relationship. However, the 
relationship between the two began to deteriorate as a result of the ANC' s desire to have Inkatha front for it in South Afiica, 
to become the intemal arm of the ANC with all that that implied with regard to where authority lay, and because of 
Buthelezi' s opposition to the school boycott in Natal, his opposition to economic and financial sanctions, his unabashed 
advocacy of the free market ru1d rejection to the ANC' s use of violence. Matters came to a head when the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), a broad, non-racial grouping of about 650 affiliates with a membership of more than two ru1d a half million 
who collectively put the emphasis on mass mobilization and protest politics and made little attempt to conceal its support 
for the ANC, was fonned in the mid-1980s to pt!Sh the cause of black enfranchisement m1d the dismantling of apartheid. The 
two organizations vied for control of Natal in lethal competition with the UDF making inroads into Inkatha strongholds in 
urban areas and Inkatha maintaining its stranglehold over rural areas. Violence in Natal became endemic. Since the mid 
"80s over 15,000 people have perished. Relations between the ANC ru1d Inkatha suffered a further setback after the 
unbanning of the ANC m1d the release of Mandel a. Mandel a reneged on a promise to meet with Buthelezi and pay his 
respects to King Zwelithini when the ANC in Natal vehemently opposed the visit. Buthelezi was deeply insulted and 
denounced the ANC for making a "captive" of Mandela. In August 1990, at a congress in Ulundi attended by more than 
12,000 people, Inkatha, hitherto an exclusively Zulu organization, transfonncd itself into a non-racial political party - the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) - and violent confrontations between supporters of Inkatha and the ANC increased, not only 
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In the Declaration oflntent, all parties agreed to certain principles on what needed to be achieved in 
our country. 
The Declaration committed the National Party government to be bound by the decisions ofCODESA, 
and to see to their implementation. CODESA itself would draft the text of all legislation necessary 
to give effect to the agreements that were reached. 
In pursuance of our intention that these negotiations were to be as inclusive as possible, there were 
no preconditions for attendance, other than that parties to the negotiations needed to be bona fide 
political parties with at least some demonstrable support in the country. While this gave a voice to 
parties who were little more than the National Party's puppets, it did make for a process in which all 
parties could be made to feel part of the negotiation process. 
In August 1990, the Mrican National Congress unilaterally suspended its armed activities as an 
indication of its commitment to a peaceful settlement. 1° Following the principle of inclusivity, the 
processes of negotiations were designed to reach an inclusive settlement. 
All agreement and decisions were to be arrived at by general consensus among all the parties. When 
general consensus couldn't be achieved, decisions were to be taken on the basis of sufficient 
consensus. 
Sufficient consem.us was defined as a process of reaching agreement that would take us to the next 
step. Essentially, it finally meant that there had to be sufficient and enough agreement between two 
parties or within two parties. Those parties were the National Party and the AN C. The parties who 
disagreed with the decision could have their objections formally recorded, but in the spirit of 
in Natal but across the East Rand. See footnote# 20. The ANC has blamed the IFP for much of the violence in South Africa 
in the early 1990s, accusing the IFP of collaborating with the secwity forces to destroy it. The investigations of the Goldstone 
commission provides evidence of collusion between elements in the secwity forces and Inkatha that resulted in the deaths 
of ANC activists. The IFP, on the other hand, blames the ANC for the violence, pointing to a long list of IFP local leaders 
who were murdered. Suffice it to say that neither side is blameless. See footnote # 20. The IFP is a strong advocate of a 
federal South Africa with as many powers as is feasible devolved from the center. It believes that the ANC is out to crush 
the IFP and establish a one-party ANC state. The Record of Understanding between the NP and the ANC infuriated 
Buthelezi who interpreted the agreement as an attempt to marginalize both him and the IFP. See footnote #19. The IFP 
walked out of the MNF after making a number of demands that the ANC and the NP would not meet. Until the last moment, 
it appeared that the IFP would boycott the April 1994 elections. 
9 Among other things, the Declaration of Intent committed participants to an undivided South Africa, peaceful 
constitutional change, a multi-party democracy with universal suffrage, a separation of powers, and a bill of rights. It was 
also agreed that an elected body, spearheaded by an elected interim government would be charged with drafting the new 
constitution. Codesa set up five working groups: on creating the climate for free political activity; on the necessary 
con...;;titutional principles to be included in a new constitution and the form the constitutional-making forum should take; on 
the arrangements for interim and transitional government; on the future of the TBVC states, and on the frames and modes 
of implementation of Codesa agreements. 
10 In May 1990, formal talks between the government and the ANC resulted in the Groote Schuur Minute on the 
freedom of political prisoners and the retum of exiles. In August, the two parties signed the Pretoria Minute, the ANC 
suspended the armed struggle and it conmlitted itself to a negotiated settlement. In September, all the major political parties 
concluded the National Peace Accord, aimed at creating the preconditions f(x a peaceful and nonviolent transition to 
democracy. In February 1991, in the secret DF Malan Accord, the government and the ANC exempted the ANC' s army, 
Umkhonto we ~lzwe, from the Peace Accord' s restrictions on private annies, and in 1991 legislation was enacted expunging 
the legal comerstones of apartheid from the statute hooks. See Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson [Edsj The Small 
Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press 1994). 
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cooperation they understood that they could not hinder the process from moving forward. 
This in many ways enabled all parties to feel that this was their process. They owned the process, 
and the process was theirs to move forward to the next phase. The process also involved full 
agreement amongst the parties on what procedures needed to be utilized. In the end, much as the 
National Party government wanted to impose certain procedures, it found that it could not do so, 
if it wanted the process to be owned by all parties. 
The sufficient consensus mechanism was not always enough to break every deadlock, particularly 
when there were significant differences between the ANC and the National Party. To deal with these 
situations, the parties utilized a number of other mechanisms. 
Bilateral meetings were extensively used, not only during multiparty negotiations, but also more 
recently during negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly. When bilateral meetings could not 
resolve deadlocks, other channels of communication were established. When those could not resolve 
deadlocks, one-on-one meetings between chief negotiators were utilized. But the central feature of 
the negotiations process that we were engaged in revolved around creating trust among the parties. 
You must remember that the ANC and the National Party came from completely different 
backgrounds and cultures, remember, too, that both were engaged in a conflict to the end or to the 
death, a conflict in which no quarter was given and none was asked for. In the end, these two parties 
had to build a lot of trust between them before they could reach a settlement. Mr. Chairperson, it was 
this trust that finally delivered a settlement in the South African coriflict. 
Without this trust we would never have been able to reach the settlement that we eventually reached. 
Of course, this trust had to be built over a long time. It had to be built over a number of processes. 
At times it faltered, and at times it failed the process. But in the end the individuals involved had to 
have some form of chemistry. 
I believe that these were the essential elements that enabled us to arrive at a settlement, and had these 
elements not been present, a settlement would have taken us a little longer. It would have arrived, 
but it would have taken us a little longer. 
I am discussing our negotiated transition with the generous benefit of hindsight. It is very easy now 
to analyze the various twists and turns that the negotiations took, identifying what went wrong and 
ultimately what worked for us. 
But when you are in the middle of it all, the answers are not usually that clear, nor are the prospects 
of reaching agreement all that promising. At the beginning of the process the obstacles are numerous 
and overwhelming. The way forward is usually uncertain. There is no guaranteed blueprint for 
success. Many people around the world never thought that the apartheid conflict would be resolved 
in their lifetime. Many of us who were involved in the process also at times did not think it would 
be resolved in our lifetime. 
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That, I imagine, is the experience of many people around the world who are involved in processes 
of resolving conflicts. The negotiation process in our country was not easy or straightforward. It 
was fraught with enormous difficulties and setbacks. It often felt that for each step we took forward, 
we took two steps backwards. Here in Northern Ireland, you might also feel exactly the same way 
at times. I am confident, however, that as much as this part of the world has seen conflict and 
bitterness, as much as there are obstacles and hindrances, as much as there is a conflict of views and 
interests, there is one thing that makes a settlement necessary, and that is the common desire for 
peace, justice, and prosperity. 
This we have certainly found to be the common denominator. The very fact that negotiations have 
started is testimony to the desire for a solution. The process obviously has to be your very own. 
Whether the negotiations that you are now engaging in finally succeed or not, is a matter that has to 
be decided by all parties. 
From where we sit, and from what RoelfMeyer and I heard from the political parties we talked with 
today, we believe that possibly a settlement is possible, that possibly it is not. The challenge to all 
parties is to capture the moment, to have that desire, and to make sure that it gives the prospect of 
negotiations sufficient impetus to see to it that a solution is attainable. 
Roe if Meyer and I were deeply involved in the negotiations in South Africa, and the one thing that 
always bound us together was the belief that there is always a solution to any problem. On many 
occasions, there were a number of problems that could not be resolved at the negotiation table. On 
such occasions we would get together with our leaders to try together to find a solution. But we 
always said to each other that whatever the problem is there is always a solution, and all we need to 
do is to try and find it. That solution. 
Mr. Chairperson, I emphatically believe that problems have solutions; that even in this part of the 
world the problems you grapple with have solutions. You can find them if you search hard enough. 
Thank you. [applause.] 
BERNARD CULLEN: Mr. Ramaphosa, thank you very much. As you said, it takes two parties 
with good will to enter into negotiations and to carry them through to a successful conclusion. Our 
second guest-speaker this evening is Mr.RoelfMeyer. 
Roelf Meyer was born in 194 7 in the Eastern Cape. He graduated in commerce and law from the 
University of the Orange Free State, and practiced as an attorney in Pretoria and Johannesburg until 
1980. 
I hate to give some of my legal friends in the audience a bigger head than they already have, 
but it won't have escaped your attention that it was two lawyers who managed to perform the miracle 
in South Mrica. 
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In 1979, Roelf Meyer was elected a member of parliament, where he served as chairman of the 
standing committee on national education, on constitutional development, and as a whip. From 1986 
to 1991 he served as Deputy Minister of Law and Order, and subsequently as Deputy Minister of 
Constitutional Development. 
In August 1991, he was brought into the Cabinet, where he was successively Minister of Defense and 
of Communications and Minister ofConstitutional Development and of Communication. In the latter 
capacity he served as the government's chief negotiator at the Multiparty Negotiating Forum11 where 
national consensus on a new interim constitution was reached, which, in turn, led to the historic 
elections of April, 1994. 
After those elections he was appointed Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 
in the government of national unity in which capacity he also served as Chief Constitutional 
Negotiator for the National Party in the Constituent Assembly. In March 1996, he was appointed 
Secretary General ofthe National Party, as well as Chairperson of that party's assembly caucus, and 
Deputy Leader of the National Assembly. Mr. Meyer, it's my pleasure and privilege to invite you to 
address our association from your perspective on how the new South Africa was negotiated. 
[applause.] 
ROELF MEYER: Thank you, Chairperson. It is a privilege for me to be here this evening with 
you. I had the opportunity also, just over a year ago, to be here at the same venue to participate in 
a conference on international peace. So it's my second time in Belfast in just over a year, and I'm 
delighted that I could come back. It's a wonderful city. 
Cyril has already informed you about the framework of the process that we went through. So I don't 
have to elaborate much on that. I would rather like to make a few practical observations as far as the 
process that we went through is concerned. 
Let me start off by saying I think it's important that I give you a little bit of a background, of where 
one is personally coming from. I know a South African in the audience who knows me quite well, 
and I think he could probably elaborate a little bit more on that, but nevertheless, I'm an Afrikaner, 
if you know what that means. 
An Afrikaner is a person of German or Dutch origin. My forefathers came to South Africa in 1695. 12 
And right through the generations all of my folk were farmers. I'm very much therefore directly 
linked to the Afrikaner establishment, with all the obligations and characteristics that go with that. 
There is nothing but farmers in my family tree. I'm the first one that got out of the kraal, got mixed-
up and became a city-boy. After I've listened to everybody today, I thought that if I was born in this 
11 In April 1993 a new fonun- the Multiparty Negotiating Fonun -(MNF)- was established to take the place of 
CODESA, which had collapsed in May 1992. See tootnote #17. Negotiations took place at the Kemptom Park Trade Center 
in Johannesburg and are often referred to as the Kemptom Park negotiations. 
12 In 1652 the Dutch East India Company established the first white colony at Table Bay in the Cape. The purpose 
of the settlement was to service the Company's ships en route to and from the Far East. The settlement grew rapidly in the 
early eighteenth century and eventually became Cape Town. 
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country I would probably have been identified as a Unionist in terms of my background. And, ifl 
may say so, I think that Cyril would probably have been identified as a Nationalist. I'm saying this 
because I want you to have an understanding of the kinds of differences that are an essential part of 
the backgrounds we come from. I'm not, in terms of my background, a liberal democrat. Politically 
speaking, I come from a very conservative background. 
Now, to make some observations, ladies and gentlemen, about the South African situation, I would, 
first of all, like to draw your attention to two typical things that we had to go through, that both sides 
had to give-up in order to bring us to where we are. 
On 2 February 1990, the announcement was made regarding the unbanning ofthe ANC and the 
release of Mr. Mandela. Immediately thereafter we started to talk. Let me for a moment just 
emphasize that on 2 February 1990, when Mr. de Klerk made his historic statement, there had been 
no formal talks prior to that between the ANC and the National Party government. 
There was not even a commitment as to whether negotiations would proceed. We, from our side, 
had taken the risk, and said, "Okay. You're free, but we're not sure whether we are going to talk." 
There was no agreement to talk at that point. It was a huge risk from our point ofview. 
But the ANC were also prepared to take a huge risk. When talks started to take place a few months 
later, the ANC against the will of their own constituency at that point, I believe, were prepared to 
suspend violence. 
These two observations indicate, I think, the kind of risk that both sides were prepared to take to 
get things going, and to get the process moving forward. But there's another important set of 
observations that one can look at. 
F.W. de Klerk was prepared in the end to step down as president ofthe country and to surrender 
power. But more than that he was also prepared to get rid of his own prejudices and the National 
Party as such, to get rid of our typical prejudices of paternalism and things like that prejudices that 
had prevailed up to the 1990s in our own situation. We always thought that we could tell the other 
side what to do, because we were in government. It was only when we realized that was not the way 
to resolve things, that things started to move forward. 
We had to accept the need to understand the other side. And to understand the process, and what 
was required to make the process work. But similarly, the ANC had to understand the need to 
understand us. 
On the National Party side, we had to face up to the fact that in the previous decades we were wrong 
in terms of what we did as far as apartheid was concerned. It needed people like Mr. Mandela, 
Cyril Ramaphosa and others to be prepared to start the process without showing any bitterness. 
If Mr. Mandela had any bitterness in his heart, he didn't show it on any occasion whatsoever . .S'o 
he never raised the point of what we had done to him and his colleagues during the era of apartheid 
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I'm saying here that I'm grateful for the fact that they showed that forgiveness, because otherwise we 
would not have made it. 
This was the essence of the dynamic chemistry that helped us to start the process: On the one side 
the preparedness to run risk, and to be prepared to surrender power; and on the other side the 
preparedness to say, "Let bygones be bygones. I almost forget about it. I forgive you for what you 
have done." Otherwise we would not have made it through the process. 
Now I don't think it would be at all possible to compare or link our experience with the situation in 
Northern Ireland. It's wrong as a departure point even to try and do that. In our situation we 
basically had no fundamental differences to resolve. It was almost as simple as a matter of color or 
race that separated us. We had to remove that problem to reach out to each other, and to discover 
each other as human beings. 
That doesn't mean that we have resolved all our problems. No doubt on the way forward, we will 
have the typical political problems that you experience in a democracy. But, at least, we have an 
established democracy within which those problems can be attended to. 
Cyril and I are still political opponents in specific capacities in our particular organizations. Maybe 
one can say we used to be enemies, now at least we are opponents. But the wonderful part of it is 
the fact that through this process of negotiations, and I can truly say this, we became friends. 
Constitutional negotiations made us friends. We didn't start off as friends, but through the 
negotiations we developed a friendship that will last long beyond our political activity. 
Some further practical observations that I would like to make are the following: I think it was 
necessary on our side to acknowledge, and we did so at the start of the process in 1989-1990, that 
the problem we were dealing with was essentially a political problem, not a security problem. 
That was a very important shift of emphasis. Because through the 1970s and the 1980s, the National 
Party government regarded the situation in terms of it being primarily a security problem that had 
to be dealt with. 13 As far as we were concerned, the ANC was an illegitimate organization opposing 
13 One can trace the origins of the thinking that defined the conflict in South Africa as a secmity problem to the 
coup in Lisbon in April 1974 that led to the independence ofMozan1bique and Angola. For the first time the chain of states 
on South Afiica' s northern perimeters with white minority governments had been broken. Hence PW Botha' s concept of 
a Total Onslaught, which had to be met with a Total Strategy. The Total Onslaught was conceived in tem1s of the threat of 
Soviet expansionism which coveted South Africa as a "strategic jewel." The State saw itself as being in a struggle for 
survival, under siege from without from the neighboring frontline states which were regarded as puppets of the Soviets, and 
thus targeted for destabilization, and from within from the violence in the townships carried out, the government believed, 
under the direction of the ANC, which it danmed as one more conmmnist front. Security became the primary focus of 
government. The South African Defence Forces (SADF) were brought into the townships to put down what was rather 
quaintly referred to as "domestic unre:'.i." The National Security Management System (NSMS), established in 1979, became 
a separate arm of government responsible only to the State President. It was comprised of key public officials, cabinet 
ministers, politicians and the security chiefs. The NSMS operated at the national, regional, and local levels, and its 
management centers covered most of the towns in South Afiica. The period 1979-1987 saw the militarization of South Africa 
on an unprecedented scale and the rise of the new ruling elite - the securocrats. The new strategy set the counter-
revolutionary agenda: Law and order would have to be restored before political reforms would be addressed. The NSMS 
became the pivotal command structure to in1plen1ent and coordinate the new strategy. On taking over as State President, FW 
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the government, which had the power; therefore, the problem had, according to our logic, to be dealt 
with on a security basis. That was the pervasive sentiment in National Party circles, and it was only 
when we decided that we were facing a political problem that we were forced to the conclusion that 
we had to look for a political solution to the problem. Which meant we had to sit down and find the 
negotiated political answer. 
A further observation: There was no chance of Cyril and myself and our negotiating colleagues to 
reach out and come to agreements without developing personal relationships. Cyril has referred 
to it. I can only emphasize it again and again. 
Negotiators need to develop a common understanding of each other's positions. In the case of 
Cyril and myself, that common understanding led to friendship. But what is very important in this 
process of coming to understand each other is that you have to put yourselves in the shoes of the 
person on the other side. Otherwise you're not going to find amwers. 
If yau keep on looking at things only from the point of view of what you want to achieve, of what you 
want or what you believe the solutions should be, then you're not going to make progress. A 
negotiator, I believe, has to look at the full perspective, the whole spectrum of matters that are on 
the agenda. Not that you should lose sight ofwhat your own interests are, of the viewpoint or policy 
that you have to advocate in the process, but unless you understand the ji1ll picture, there's no 
chance for progress. The best way to understand the full picture is to put yourself in the shoes of the 
other person. 
My experience of Cyril Rarnaphosa is that he did exactly that. He tried to understand what were the 
difficulties that I had to deal with, as regards the National Party and the negotiations. I tried to do 
the same, to understand his situation as regards the ANC and negotiations. 
And through that we were able to develop an understanding of what was possible, and what was not 
possible in the negotiating process. The personal chemistry between negotiators is, as Cyril said 
earlier, a very important ingredient of successful negotiations. You simply can' t overestimate its 
importance. 
Cyril also pointed out the agreement we arrived at was essentially an agreement between the ANC 
and the National Party. That's true. But one mustn't forget that at most stages ofthe negotiating 
process they were, in our case, twenty-six parties around the table. 14 It is not as if it was only the two 
de Klerk set about dismantling the NSMS apparatus and reestablishing the primacy of the Cabinet. 
14 The MNF was more inclusive than CODESA. The PAC, the IFP, and the CP participated in the process, 
although the IFP walked out late in the process. The IFP, CP, A VU ( the Afrikaner Volksfront was comprised of a number 
of former members of the CP who had earlier become disillusioned with the CP' s refusal to have anything to do with the 
process), the Ciskei' s military dictator, Oupa Gqoso, and Bophuthatswana' president, Lucas Mangope, fom1ed a loose 
alliance -the Concerned South Africa Group (COSAG)- to counterbalance what they perceived as ANCINP control of the 
process as a result of the Record of Understanding reached between the two parties in September 1992. See footnote #19. 
Traditional leaders in each province were each given a delegation. 
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of us or the two parties. There were quite a number of others. Even after some left, like the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP), there were still twenty different parties around the table. But the point is some 
direction has to be given. Otherwise, there is not going to be progress. If you leave it, or in our 
case, if we had left it up to twenty plus different parties to all work everything according to all their 
wishes, we would not have succeeded. Some direction is needed in such circumstances, and I believe 
that is the point that Cyril wanted to emphasize. 
In the process ofbuilding this relationship, building this understanding, the concepts of bilateral and 
multilateral discussions, are, of course, important. In other words, if you come to a point where those 
around the table in a plenary session can't make progress on a particular point, then the best option 
is to take whatever the matters in dispute is off the table, remove it from the agenda for a while. 
Take it to a bilateral discussion. And if that doesn't succeed, or even ifyou make progress there, 
take it to your colleagues from other parties and make sure that there's progress at the multilateral 
level. 
The whole process of using different methods- bilateral and multilateral discussions- over and above 
the formal structure of negotiations is very important according to our experience. 
Another observation: The need for internal negotiations within your own party rank<; is equally 
important as having negotiations with the other side. If you can't take your own constituency with 
you, you're not going to get the approval you need to reach agreements with the other side. 
In other words, internal negotiations with your party leadership and with your party colleagues is 
offimdamental importance if you want to move the process forward Otherwise, things can easily 
get out ofhand, because differences within your own ranks can easily develop. We experienced that 
in our own case. In the end, only intensive intra party negotiations enabled us to resolve some 
serious inter party differences, which, had they not been resolved, would have brought the negotiating 
process to a standstill. Intra-party consensus is a precursor to inter-party consensus. 
Another observation I would like to make from our own experience is the importance of setting 
timetables and keeping to them. We did it on more than one occasion. It is not good enough in 
terms of our experience to set a timetable and target dates, while at the same time continuing to think 
that you can extend them if necessary. 
If there is a target date find agreement between the parties, keep to it rigidly, even ruthlessly. I can 
specifically refer to two examples in our own case. If we didn't set ourselves a target date to 
complete the transitional constitution by November 1993, we would not have been able to succeed 
in holding the elections in April 1994, the elections that were the final act in the liberation of South 
Africa. If we hadn' t succeeded in getting the interim constitution written and adopted within the 
time limit that we set ourselves, we would not have been able to hold elections when we did. 
Similarly, this year with the new constitution, May 9th, 1996 was a specific target date we set two 
years earlier to complete the writing of the country's final constitution, and we just kept to it. We 
forced our colleagues to work literally day and night to meet that target date. They complained. 
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Other parties said we were too harsh. We said, "Okay. Then we are harsh. But the job must be 
done, and we intend to get it done." The problem is the moment you start extending target dates, 
people get relaxed, discipline starts to weaken, and they think, "Well, if it's not tomorrow, then it 
could just as well be next week or next month or next year." Then it becomes indefinite, and there's 
no constraint to the process. In our case we could not allow that. We had to find answers within 
time limits. 
I'm almost finished, Chairperson. Let me just make two further observations. The notion of 
sufficient consensus to which Cyril referred and finding ways to deal with sensitive matters of a 
practical or procedural nature became very important in our situation. For instance, the question 
of who would chair the Negotiating CounciP5 was something we had to resolve. We decided to look 
at the collective processes. In other words, we appointed within our own structures a panel of 
chairpersons who could lead the process, and who could contribute to the whole notion of sufficient 
consensus. But they came from within the Negotiating Council itself, so as to insure that all parties 
involved felt that they had an equal stake in the ownership of the process. 
In this regard, the whole idea of ownership of the process by those involved is fundamental. Not 
only has one to get all parties concerned to the table; one has to insure that each party at the end can 
feel that it has subscribed to whatever outcome emerges. Therefore, you must make sure that each 
party participates at least with the expectation that every party is equal in the process of participation. 
Of course, we could not succeed in everything. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) left the process 
during the negotiations for the transitional constitution, and they did it again when we were 
negotiating the recently adopted final constitution. 16 
So we had our problems and made mistakes during the process. But I think what is important today 
is that we can say that at least 90 percent of the people of South Mrica through their participation 
in the election of 1994 subscribed to the new democratic model we have in our country. That level 
of participation would not have been possible if we didn't succeed in getting everybody on board in 
the negotiating process. 
Lastly, I think it's important to reflect some on how we tried to deal with deadlocks, and how we 
handled the situation when negotiations broke down. In May 1992, we had a total deadlock in 
negotiations. We had a breakdown at the official level between the governing party and other parties 
15 The Negotiating Council was one of the key discussion bodies at Kempton Park. It was comprised of each 
party's chief negotiator and one adviser and met several times a week. 
16 In June the CP left the negotiations. It said it would only return if the negotiating council accepted that the 
Afrikaner people had the right to self-detennination and constitution. In July the IFP followed. On 17 July, Buthelezi 
announced that the IFP would not return to negotiations until other parties agreed that no decision could be made without 
its agreement, thus challenging the whole concept of"sufficient consensus." Buthelezi also insisted on new agreements on 
regions under which they would have a degree of independence, something both the South African government (SAG) and 
the ANC were adamantly opposed to. Meetings between the IFP and the SAG continued, but to no avail. Sec The Small 
Miracle. 
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in CODES~ including the ANC. 17 
CODESA broke up, and no further negotiations took place among the different parties. But the ANC 
and ourselves - the National Party - continued for another month at the bilateral level. And then 
suddenly there was a total breakdown of negotiations between us. 
After a massacre of shack-dwellers at Boipatong on 22 June 1992, the ANC said it was finished 
talking with the government, that it was in fact cutting all ties with the govemment. 18 No further 
talks. I remember Mr. Mandela announcing this on the evening television news. And I said to 
myself, "Oh, damn it! There we go." All the hard work up to that point appeared to be over. It 
seemed everything had been for nothing. Then a few minutes later, Cyril phoned me at my home in 
Pretoria. And I said, "What the hell are you doing?" And his response was, "When can we talk?" 
Which at least gives you an indication of the kind of understanding that already existed between us 
at that point, an understanding that enabled us to proceed with talks. What I am saying is you need 
a channel. If everything jails, you still need a channel you can use to keep talks going. 
But the important point is for the next three months, that is from June 1992 to September 1992 that 
year, for those three months, the two of us, Cyril and myself, were almost locked in by our principals, 
by our leaders to find a way to end the deadlock. For three months we worked, day and night, to 
come up with a process our respective parties could agree to that would allow us to move matters 
forward. 
17 When CODESA met in plenary session on 15 and 16 May 1992, substantial agreement had been reached in 
tour of the five working groups regarding the way forward, including agreement for a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) 
that would oversee arrangements for elections to a Constituent Assembly, the activities of the SAG and parliament, both of 
which would have to act on its directives; on an election for a Constituent Assembly/ National Assembly which would be 
held on the basis of universal franchise and proportional representation; on having the Constituent Assembly draw up a new 
constitution on the basis of principles drawn up at CODESA; on an interim powersharing government; on new elections to 
follow the adoption of the new constitution. However, in Group II, failure to reach agreement on the specialmajmities that 
would be required to include items in a bill of rights or the constitution triggered an impasse that led to the breakdown of 
the process. For an account of the manouverings and posturing that were adopted by both the SAG and the ANC (there is 
cause to believe that both wanted out of CODESA, but for different reasons. See Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another 
Country\ New York: Hill and Wang 1995) 
8 On 18 June 1992, 43 residents of Boipatong, a township south of Johannesburg, were massacred by Zulu-
speaking residents of the KwaMadala hostel. Many residents insisted that the attack had taken place with the knowledge and 
involvement of the police, even to the extent that the police had escorted the attackers into the township and out again. In 
the uproar that followed among supporters of the ANC , who were convinced that the attack was supported by the police 
as part of a government to weaken the ANC at the grassrool'i, the ANC broke off all contact with the government. "We can 
no longer explain to our people," Mandel a said, "why we are talking to a regime that continues to murder our people. " 
(According to some accotmts, Mandela was devastated when he addressed a rally in Evaton township, near Boipatong, two 
days after the massacre and was greeted by 20,000 people chanting: "We are the lambs and you are leading us to the 
slaughter.") When de Klerk tried to make a conciliatory visit to Boipatong three days after the massacre, he was literally 
driven from the township by an angry mob. In the pandemonium that followed police opened fire on the crowd, killing at 
least three people, adding further to the tensions, already running at fever level, between the SAG and ANC. 
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We had to come up with something, and we did. It became known as the Record of Understanding, 
an agreement between the ANC and the National Party government that formed the basis of the 
mutual trust which was the foundation for all further negotiations. 19 If I have to record the most 
outstanding moment in terms of the whole negotiating process in South Mrica, it was that period. 
Because apart from the document that we produced during those three months and the fact that we 
were able to unlock the deadlock, the most important thing to emerge out of that period was the trust 
Cyril and I developed in each other. After that, it was possible to deal with all problems, all 
disputes. 
All differences were not suddenly removed, but I knew that from that point on, I could trust Cyril 
Rarnaphosa, and I believe he could do the same with me. That helped us to build not only a personal 
relationship, but it also succeeded in bridging the yawning gap between our two organizations and 
brought them to the point of being able to believe in each other, and know that the other was bona 
fide in terms of its aims and objectives and sincere in trying to find common ground to build the 
common objective - that was to bring democracy to South Mrica. Thank you very much. 
[applause.] 
BERNARD CULLEN: Mr. Meyer, thank you, very much. Part of the ethos of the Irish association 
is to have our members participate in the discussion and engage in dialogue with our visitors. 
There are two roving mikes. Please use them and let us know your name, and if you wish, any 
organization you represent. Could I finally say that the number of people who will wish to speak are 
many, and the minutes remaining are few. So please keep your contributions as concise as you 
possibly can. Exercise great restraint. 
Because of his reputation for being such an effective and efficient moderator, I'm happy to pass over 
the moderation of the discussion to Padraigh 0' Malley. [applause.] 
19 On 26 September 1993, after three intensive months of negotiations between Ramaphosa and Meyer on behalf 
of their principals, Mandela and DeKlerk, the two leaders met at the World Trade Center and signed a Record of 
Understanding that committed both sides to resuming multiparty negotiations. The ANC 1 s fourteen conditions for the 
resumption of negotiations had been reduced to three: The government would have to release a number of political prisoners 
including several on death-row for murders committed during the "armed struggle", fence Inkatha hostels, and ban the 
carrying of "cultural weapons". The government conceded on all three. In effect, the SAG shifled gears. Mer more than 
a year of trying to woo Buthelezi in an attempt to form an anti-ANC alliance, the govenunent gave up the attempt and 
e&.<;eBtially threw in their lot with the AN C. Henceforth, the two major parties would drive the process. Progress, they both 
had come to llllderstand- the ANC sooner than the NP - depended on the ANC and the NP agreeing beforehand on the key 
is..;;ues. But both sides also knew that as many parties as possible had to be brought into line, and that the best way to achieve 
this was to create a sense of inevitable momentum; hence the emphasis on timetables, speeding up the process and forcing 
the pace. In such a climate, the two sides believed that the other parties would climb on board what appeared to be an 
llllstoppable negotiations 1 train. All of this was achieved in the light of some key compromises on the ANC 1 s part, most 
importantly its commitment to temporary power sharing in what would become a govenunent of national unity. Ironically, 
the NP bailed out of the government in July 1996, some three years before the arrangement was due to come to an end, 
having decided that its future would be better served if it became the official Opposition. 
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PADRAIGH O'MALLEY: Thank you, Bernard. First, I would like to express my deepest 
gratitude to both Cyril and Roelffor taking the time from their very busy schedules to make the long 
journey to Belfast for what amounts to little more than 24 hours to share with us their experience in 
South Afiica. And to share their experience with all political parties here who wish to listen and learn 
from their experience. I am glad to say that all parties in Northern Ireland have taken advantage of 
that opportunity. Some have had meetings with Cyril and Roelftoday; others will tomorrow. 
Before I open the discussion to the floor, there are a few things I would like to hear both Cyril and 
Roelf elaborate on a little more. The first is the question of trost. How do you develop trust, and 
how do you extend it from the personal level to your constituency level? Second, what is the nature 
of compromise? You both go to the table with your own mandated agendas. 
How do you trade those agendas to reach a settlement which enables all parties to the conflict to feel 
that they are winners, or at least to give them that illusion? How do you arrive at that point of 
agreement as to what constitutes an adequate compromise ? Third, the thorniest question that faces 
us in this part of our island is the question of the decommissioning of arms. When the ANC was 
unbanned in February of 1990, the question of the surrender of arms became an issue. I would like 
to hear how the ANC and the National Party government dealt with the issue of how you can 
decommission arms. Or whether indeed you can decommission; whether you allowed or could have 
allowed the issue of decommissioning to derail substantive political negotiations?. 
And lastly, I would like you both to elaborate a little about what you mean when you talk about the 
ownership of process. How do you establish ownership of process in a way where enemies become 
opponents, and opponents become negotiating partners? That's it. [laughter.] 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: That's quite a mouthful. [laughter.] 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: I thought that there were going to be two questions, Padraigh! I'd like 
to start offwith something I thought I would say when Padraigh was out of this room. But he seems 
to be glued to his chair, and he's not about to go out. 
I just want to say thank you for having brought us here. Roelf and I have known Padraigh for quite 
a while, and he's one Irish person who's been following the South Mrican drama as it has unfolded. 
And during that period we've come to know him quite well. And we would like to thank him for 
being in South Mrica, as our transition to democracy unfolded and happened. And also for 
understanding why it unfolded as it did. 
The first question is trust, how do you develop trust? I don't know how you develop it. But I can 
only talk about how we did it. Somehow trost happened de,\pite ourselves. And in hindsight, as we 
look back, we discovered that trust was an enormously important part of the process, that trust built 
a lot of confidence into the negotiation process. The fact that Nelson Mandela could say as he left 
prison that "De Klerk is a man of integrity," was one of those important moments in the whole 
negotiation process. He was acknowledging that he was dealing with a person who could keep his 
word. The word de Klerk kept was that he was going to release Nelson Mandela and other prisoners, 
and he did. 
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However, as time went on Nelson Mandela's view of de Klerk changed. It changed because of the 
question of violence. I would have said exactly the same thing ifRoelfwas here- he has just gone 
out to phone a family member who is not well. But he's coming back. 
It changed because violence continued to ravage our country, and Mandela kept saying, "DeKlerk, 
only you can stop the violence," and he thought de Klerk would not take the measures necessary to 
stop the violence. 20 
Trost developed between Roe if Meyer and myself after we started interacting with each other in a 
formal sense, and, more importantly, perhaps, when we began to interact h?formally. During the 
course of our discussions with the various parties here, we asked them, "Do you relate to each other 
beyond the forma/level?" And most C?f them said, "What do you mean?" "Do you ever sit down to 
have a cup of tea together? Do you ever sit down to have a drink together? Do you ever sit in an 
armchair-type C?f situation and talk? At any level, do you?" And faces went blank. 
Trust can also be built when assurances that are given are acted on. When parties give certain 
assurances, the assurances can inspire a lot of confidence, if something is done to carry them through. 
We certainly found that reciprocation was very important. 
When the National Party government unbanned the ANC, it was saying, "We want you to reciprocate 
in a particular way." When we, as the ANC, suspended armed action of our own volition, we 
expected them to do certain things. We expected that negotiations would commence. If you, for 
instance, give up your most important weapon, you expect the other party to reciprocate and get the 
process underway. 
Had the negotiations in our situation not started when the ANC suspended armed action, the ANC 
would have gone back to armed action. Had the National Party unbanned the ANC and the ANC had 
20 In August 1990, violence between Inkatha supporters and suppmters of the ANC swept across the Eastern 
Rand, increased in intensity in KwaZulu/Natal and other parts of the country; unprovoked massacres, random attacks on 
commuter trains with gunmen running from car to car methodically mowing down passengers and throwing passengers off 
the moving train; attacks on minivan taxis ferrying people to and from the townships and rural areas; random drive-by 
shootings by AK-47 wielding gangs; the burning and looting of homes and the torching of squatter camps; violent 
confrontations between migrant hostel dwellers, mostly Inkatha supporting Zulus from rural Natal and township residents 
becan1e endemic. The ANC accused the government ofbeing behind the violence; of using a "third force" to foment and 
orchestrate the violence in an effort to destroy the ANC, undermine its suppm1 in the black community, and hinder its 
attempts to organize the masses in the townships. The ANC believed that the govenunent could put a stop to the activities 
of the "third force" if it chose to. The government, and de Klerk in particular, strenuously denied the existence of a third 
force or the involvement of the security forces, except perhaps for rogue elements acting on their own. In 1992, in the 
aftermath ofBoipatong, mounting intemational criticism, and the increasing likelihood that the umestrained violence would 
terminally undermine negotiations, de Klerk established a commission, under the chairmanship of Justice Richard Goldstone, 
to investigate the catL<:es of the violence. Goldstone's investigations unveiled a far more :-:ystemic involvement of element<> 
in the sectuity forces, some ofwhich had been set up in the heydays of the NSMS to cany out covert activities both in the 
frontline states and in South Africa itself, that vindicated many of the ANC' s accusations. 
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not suspended armed action, certain things would not have happened - negotiations would not have 
started. There has to be reciprocation, and recognition that when the other party does certain things -
unilateral or on an own-volition basis, you must reciprocate by doing certain things. 
The ANC decided to adopt the concept of a government of National Unity. But this meant that the 
National Party also had to do certain things. It had to give certain assurances. It had to make sure 
that the civil servants were part of the settlement; that the defense force was part of the settlement; 
that the police were part of the settlement. 
When we extended a hand of understanding and friendship, we expected reciprocation. And that built 
a lot of trust. 
Compromise? Yes, there had to be compromise. We always knew that in the end, ?f you went into 
negotiations, there had to be compromise. Originally the ANC wanted to shoot its way into Pretoria 
and take power by force. That's what we originally wanted to do. That is what everyone in the 
movement had been trained for, had been motivated to do over the years since we were banned. But 
once the prospect of negotiations became real, we knew that we could no longer just shoot our way 
into Pretoria. Similarly, the National Party wanted to destroy the ANC. They made attempts to 
bomb us in Lusaka, in Zimbabwe, in Mozambique and so on. They wanted to obliterate the ANC. 
Both of us failed in our original objectives. We could not obliterate, wipe each other off the face 
of the earth. So, we were left with no alternatives: there had to be an accommodation, a 
compromise, and the compromise had to be a win-win type of situation. 
But in order to get to that point both of us had to move from our original positions. We had to give 
up a number ofthings. We, as the ANC, had never wanted to have a government of national unity. 
We had always opposed power sharing. But we had to give up the notion of having a normal 
democratic dispensation in which the winner takes all. That was a difficult river for us to cross. 
Because ideologically we could not get to grips with having to compromise in that way, but to 
achieve peace we had to. 
On the question ofthe decommissioning of arms. After unbanning the ANC came back into South 
Africa, but in order for its leaders to be able to come back, they had to be given indemnity from 
prosecution. You must remember that the leaders of the ANC were people who were throwing 
bombs, who were leading the liberation struggle, who were engaged in armed conflict. 
The ANC, ofits own volition, suspended armed action. Throughout the struggle the apartheid rulers 
kept saying, "IfNelson Mandela renounces violence, he will be released from prison." And Nelson 
Mandela said, "That I will not do." Had de Klerk insisted before he released Nelson Mandela on 
Nelmn Mandela renouncing violence, Mandela would never have done it. 
The armed struggle was symbolic. It was psychological. After suspending armed action, the ANC 
still had its arms concealed in caches throughout the country and in exile. The demand from the 
government--the demand at the negotiating table, the demand RoelfMeyer made to me was that in 
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order for these discussions, the negotiations to proceed, "You've got to hand over all your weapons." 
The answer from the ANC was, "We can't. What is important to us is that the negotiations are 
proceeding." I'm just relating the reality of our situation. More than anything else, our response was 
symbolic. 
Had the National Party insisted that the weapons should be handed over, there would never have 
been a settlement. There would never have been the moment of reaching a settlement. But we also 
agreed that in the course of the negotiations we would discuss ways in which all these weapons could 
be handled. It Was' agreed that when we reached a final settlement, then the ANC would hand over 
its arms, where there would be joint control and mechanisms put in place that would deal with the 
problem. But decommissioning was never made a precondition for negotiations. 
Ownership of process? From the beginning the government had wanted to own the process, to lead 
the process, and to impose a number of procedures. It was informed that it could not ever have that 
control. Anything that had to happen had to be jointly agreed. They had wanted to control 
everything - up to and including who should pray and what type of prayers should be said when the 
negotiations started. 
They were a government accustomed to doing things for people, and they had to be disabused of the 
idea that things could go on that way during negotiations. In the end the government accepted that 
there had to be a different way. All of us owned the process. We all decided who should chair. It 
was an historic moment when all of us agreed that the Chief Justice of the country should chair -
a chief justice we had never recognized and never accepted But when we agreed that he should 
chair, it was in a way a recognition of the role that a chief justice should play. 
We also agreed that we should have seven prayers, and we started teaching the National Party 
tolerance. We said, "There will be a Christian prayer, a Muslim prayer, a Hindu prayer, a Jewish 
prayer, and so forth and so forth, and a Catholic prayer. Yes, and a Catholic prayer. [laughter.] 
Chairperson, I can say that in many ways we started the whole process by teaching tolerance to those 
who were less tolerant. I can say the National Party could not stand the idea of someone standing 
up and reciting a prayer in Moslem or in Arabic. They couldn't. It was foreign, alien to them, and 
we took them by the hand and we taught them. 
Of course, they also taught us many things. But that was an historic moment for us. The response 
even from those groups, the minority groups, Moslem and Hindu, was overwhelming. They said, 
"We have finally been accepted as South Africans." Sorry, I took so long. Thank you. [applause.] 
ROELF MEYER: Chairperson, I will be brief I can only associate myself with what I heard Cyril 
say. Unfortunately, I had to go outside to make a quick telephone call. But from what I did hear 
Cyril say, I can associate myselfwith everything he said. 
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Except to say that, "Yes, we also taught him certain things in the process." For instance, the fact that 
it is a good idea to open meetings with prayers. 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: Yes, it is. [laughter.] 
ROELF MEYER: The ANC was not used to that kind of culture. The two points that I would like 
to make are the following: 
First, attitudes of whites on many 51Jbjects were unacceptable and had to be changed- taboos, could 
not remain taboos. Unless this change in attitude had happened, we would not have been able to 
make any progress whatsoever: that was the cultural change ifi can say so. The kind of political 
cultural change that was one had to make and in the end, if I look back at it, our world didn't fall 
apart on account ofthat. We have a better South Africa now. 
In the circumstances of this change, we were prepared to make compromises. We were prepared to 
look for amwers even when it seemed that no answers seemed to exist. People might say, "But, yes, 
you dealt with a situation in South Mrica where the only requirement was to find a democracy. The 
only need was to find a constitutional solution that would embrace democracy. People might say that. 
People might say that in many other parts of the world there is democracy. 
That's true. But we are not reflecting on the kind of issue, we are reflecting on the kind of process. 
I believe that what we experienced in South Africa in terms of proce5~<> can certainly be related to any 
other problematic situation or area of COl?flict, no matter where it exists. I have no doubt about that. 
The second point of significance that comes to mind, once one has had an opportunity to reflect on 
the whole process, is the fact that it was very important to try and understand different value 5ystems 
in the process. The background that I and the government of the National Party had come from was 
set in a specific value system - one could call it in the context of South Mrica, typically white middle 
class value system, a value system in which we had isolated ourselves. 
Once we discovered that it was possible to interact with other value systems, with people coming 
from a traditional rural background, like in the previous homelands, and so forth, all sorts of new 
opportunities started to develop. 
On the question of decommissioning, we used other terms in our situation. I referred to part of it at 
the beginning. The fact that the ANC at an early stage was prepared to suspend violence, made it 
possible for us to make progress. 
Without that announcement of the su5pension of violence, I must admit that it would probably not 
have been possible for us to sell our constituency on the likelihood of any progress whatsoever 
being achieved on the negotiating front. 
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However, in the next phase ofthe process, the one Cyril referred to, we never actually believed that 
the ANC would hand over its weapons. Yes, it was a demand on our side, and I spoke very 
frequently to Cyril about it. But we always found ways to bypass it. 
It's strange, you know, if you have to find a way to bypass something, you can find a way. We had 
to, because if we made decommissioning a stumbling block we realized that it would become more 
than a stumbling block; it would end the process. Because the ANC could not be seen by their 
constituency to be surrendering. Quite frankly, on our side, we were not concerned about all those 
so-called caches. I don't think they were worth much in any case. 21 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: Deep down. [laughter.] 
ROELF MEYER: I was not concerned, but in terms of the debate with the constituencies, his and 
mine, it was necessary to raise it from time to time, but it was also necessary to find ways to bypass 
it. Our focus was not to let the whole process get stuck on an issue like that. In the end ifwe look 
back, that was a milestone. 
[END OF TAPE) 
PADRAJGH 0' MALLEY: We have time for a few questions from the floor. Let's start with this 
lady here. 
Q: I'd like to ask both speakers the same question. There must have been times during negotiations 
where you were compromising on such fundamental tenets, such fundamental things, that you were 
actually in danger from time to time of losing the support of your own electorate and your own 
supporters. How did you communicate with your respective constituencies to secure their ongoing 
agreement regarding what you were negotiating and compromising on? 
PADRAIGH 0' MALLEY: We'll take a number of questions together. So who else? 
Q: I would say most of the people in this room have been looking for analogies, maybe a small 
number of people have been looking for non analogies between the situation here and in South Mrica. 
Could I just briefly give you three non-analogies, and then a question? 
21 0ne of the factors that moved the ANC in the direction of a negotiated settlement was the realization that it could 
not overthrow the South African regime through armed stmggle. Indeed, in the view of many analysts, the anned stmggle 
wa<> more honored in the breach than in the observance. But the rhetoric of the rumed stmggle as a full scale peoples' war 
against the South Afiican state became a powerful symbol of mobilization, particularly for black youth in the townships for 
whom militancy was an esst-"'ltial part of the culture of resistance. Moreover, govenunent propaganda exaggerated the threat 
of the ANC' s armed stmggle in keeping with the strategy of the Total Onslaught. Indeed, during the hearings of the Tmth 
and Reconciliation Commission, it emerged that some of the more widely-publicized acts of"terrorism" attributed to the MK 
were in fact carried out by counter-insurgency units of the state security forces. Although the government had made the 
ANC' s renunciation of violence a precondition for talks, the Pretoria Minute finessed the question and the semantics of 
renunciation were not allowed to stand in the way of getting negotiations under way. 
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PADRAIGH 0' MALLEY: Sure. But could we have the question first? 
Q: You will have three little tiny statements, and then a question. The whites in South Mrica were 
in power as a minority, that's not the case here. The Unionists are not in power and are a majority. 
South Afiica has a unit of self determination that was hardly an issue in the talks, perhaps the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) had some notions of their own in that regard, but it wasn't a central issue. The 
talks process in Northern Ireland is not owned by the participants because we aren't a sovereign state, 
and for that reason the question of ownership is a different matter here. My question is on the South 
Mrican Communist Party. I would like to hear some assessment of the role ~~the South Africa 
Communist Party (SACP) in in the years up to liberation, and your views qfwhat its role in the 
future will be ?22 
Q: Why are you giving us a top-down view of the peace treaty, when in fact when what was actually 
happening on the ground was more important? 
Q: How far did the threat of the abyss help the process towards agreement? 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: Thank you. How did we communicate with our constituencies, 
particularly when we had to reach compromises that would place us in difficulties with those 
constituencies? 
I have to admit that at certain points during the negotiation process it was very tricky, and difficult 
when we had to reach compromise on a number of issues. For instance, just to give you a quick 
example: The suspension of armed action by the ANC caused enormous problems within the 
movement. Many people did not understand and could not identity with the decision that had been 
taken at the top. But leadership had to be given. From the top. The leadership had the courage to 
make the decision and to stick with it in the face of a lot of criticism on the ground. We had enormous 
difficulties within our ranks to get people to understand. 
22 The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was launched in 1921. It changed its name to the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) in 1953. The National Party government banned communism in general and the CPSA in 
particular in 1950 came it pa.">Sed the Suppression of Communism Act. In terms of this act a communist was defmed as any 
person who proposed to bring about any political, industrial, social or economic change in the country through illegal means 
- a definition broad enough to include anybody who opposed apartheid. During the 1950s, the SACP worked in close 
alliance with the ANC leading to acctL.;;ations that the party controlled the AN C. These suspicions led many ultra-nationalist 
members of the ANC to resign and was one of the factors that resulted in the formation of the Pan Mricanist Congress 
(PAC). Over the years a very close relationship developed between the ANC and the SACP. After the restructuring of the 
of the ANC in 1990, a number of prominent members of the SACP were appointed to key positions in the ANC hierarchy. 
After the ANC'sl991 National Executive Committee (NEC) elections, an estimated 25 out of the 50 members were 
allegedly members of both organizations. The SACP supports the ANC' s "mixed economy" orientation, but still adheres 
to the ultimate vision of a socialist economy - a "mixed economy" is simply viewed as a step on the way to socialism. The 
view lingers that the SACP occupies pivotal positions in the ANC and that it, therefore, exercises a level of influence within 
the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance out of all proportion with its support in the country. The NP still conjures up the dire 
threat of a communist takeover via the SACP' s control of the ANC, although it has ditliculty ruticulating just what it is that 
a South Mrican Communist stands for, a question many members of the SACP itself have ditliculty answering. 
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When we decided on a government of national unity, which is essentially power sharing, we 
encountered other enormous difficulties, because that, too, was a decision taken by the leadership at 
the top. So it too was top down. 
This is leading me to the third question, which one gentleman asked. We had enormous problems, 
but these were problems that we had to deal with: The continuation of negotiations when violence 
was raging, the continuation of negotiations when it seemed like we were not making progress, were 
other areas that led our constituencies to doubt the legitimacy of the process, and left them feeling 
alienated from it. 
However, as the ANC, we made sure that we communicated with the structures of our movement 
on an ongoing basis. We had to set up special committees right down to branch level, regional level 
and so on that dealt with negotiations. We had to hold meetings. I had to travel around the country, 
Mandela and many others had to travel around the country to address our own constituency, to 
communicate with them regarding what was happening in the negotiations. We had to do that on an 
ongoing basis. We even published a bulletin or a newspaper, which came out weekly, which went 
to the key decision makers within our own organization. 
The second person asked about the role of the SACP. The South African Communist Party is part 
of the tripartite alliance which is led by the ANC, and it is made up of the ANC, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU)23 and the SACP. It is what we call a strategic alliance or 
relationship whose main objective or whose central objective has always been the eradication of 
apartheid, the installation of democracy, and the eradication of racism. That is what has held the 
alliance together since 1921. It was joined by COSATU in the '80s. Before COSATU, there was 
another trade union arm of the labor movement involved. 
That alliance continues because of our belief that we still have to transform South Africa into a truly 
democratic, non-racist and non-sexist country, and to make it a country where all our people can 
enjoy justice and prosperity. These objectives, much as some of them may have been attained, have 
not all been fully attained. So there is still a need for the alliance to continue. 
Many of our detractors have sought to destroy this alliance and they have failed and will continue to 
fail because it is a strategic alliance which has been at the forefront of destroying apartheid. It was 
this anvil that we called the alliance that finally defeated the apartheid system. 
21 The Congress of South Afiican Trade Unions (COSATU) was tom1ed in 1985. In April 1990, COSATU becan1e 
the third ann of the ANC/SACP alliance. COSATU has a strong national and regional structure and with well over a million 
members is the largest and strongest trade union federation in South Africa. It played a key role in the mass mobilization 
can1paigns in the late 1980s, and again in the early 1990s when "rolling" mass action became one of the ANC' s most 
effective bargaining chips. The increasing demands of the global economy in the post-apartheid era and the relentless 
pursuit of foreign investment has led to strained relations on occasion between COSA TU and the ANC-dominated 
government. 
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One gentleman said we have talked about the peace process as though it was all from the top down. 
Let me say to the honorable gentleman who asked this question that what started unfolding at grass 
roots level could never have happened in the way that he relates, if certain initiatives were not taken 
from the top. Period. 
If the National Party had not unbanned the ANC and if the ANC had not taken certain decisions, 
negotiations would never have started. What had to be done from the top was to create a climate 
which was conducive for negotiations to take place. And those negotiations that he speaks of were 
taking place because the climate was created at a particular level. 
And with respect, if the gentleman understood the background that I come from, which is a grass 
roots background, I think he would not have put the question in the way that he did. Because the 
ANC is a grass-roots organization. It does not operate from top to bottom. What we are talking 
about here is the negotiations process. 
How far did the prospect of failure help us to move towards negotiations? A failure to reach a 
settlement in South Africa could have had ghastly consequences all around And in many wqys that 
is what led us to reach agreement. We both fought each other to some form of a standstill. We had 
not defeated the apartheid government; they had not defeated us. But we had to reach a 
compromise because the country was spiraling down to a catastrophe; economically, socially and 
politically. The country was becoming ungovernable. At the same time our own constituency had 
expectations ofthe ANC to deliver a settlement ofthe apartheid problem. Both of us, therefore, were 
tied to a situation where we had to negotiate a settlement to apartheid. Fortunately, we did. 
[Applause.] 
ROELF MEYER: On the first question ofwhether or how we succeeded in bringing our own 
constituency along, maybe I should take one example for the sake of time. At a very crucial point 
in 1992, the National Party government had lost a number of by-elections, 24 which led to the 
assumption that we didn't have the support of the white community for the ongoing negotiations. Mr. 
de Klerk decided to call a referendum among the white electorate. He came out with close to 70 
percent in support of negotiations and the direction the negotiations were taking at that stage. That, 
of course, provided the platform and the impetus to proceed with the negotiations and ensured that 
we brought our constituency along with us. 
24 In March 1992, de Klerk called a whites-only referendwn to deal with a challenge from the right-wing, 
specifically the CP which had won two by-elections at the expense of the NP. (In a February 1992 by-election in 
Potchefstroom, the CP won a seat formerly held by the NP Speaker of the House. The seat had been an NP stronghold since 
1948). The CP charged that de Klerk was acting without a mandate from the white community. Although the ANC was 
none too pleased at one more whites-only election, Mandel a held the ANC' s populist elements in check and urged whites 
to support de Klerk. De Klerk, with the support of the liberal white community that had traditionally voted against the NP, 
secured over two-thirds of the vote, effectively emasculating the CP and other more right-wing parties. At CODESA, the 
NP toughened its negotiating stance after the referendum, in the belief that the extent of its victory over the reactionary right 
had boosted its standing internationally, giving it more leeway to play hardball, that it could put together a winning anti-ANC 
alliance that would not find di:,favor with the international community. 
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Our own experience suggests that it is not only necessary to work within the structures of the party 
at the top, at the cabinet level or the executive level, but also to work through to the ground level. 
One should seek opportunities to test the will of the people, so to speak, and to insure that one takes 
them along all the time. 
As regards the reference to the SACP, I would like to say two things. One is, that here were certain 
members of the communist party who participated in a very constructive way in the negotiations. The 
most outstanding one was Joe Slovo himsel£25 I personally can testifY that Joe Slovo was one of the 
most constructive contributors to the whole process of political negotiations in South Mrica. I 
personally had a very good relationship with him. His contribution was great. 
I must also say that there are people in the communist party who are now members of cabinet, who, 
it seems to me, became members of the party for the sake of being part of the struggle. Which is not 
to say that they are necessarily ideologically bound to Communist theories and philosophies. 
There is one example--I probably shouldn't mention names--
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: I do. 
ROELF MEYER: Do you? 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: We love gossip. [laughter.] 
ROELF MEYER: Well, there is one of my ex-cabinet colleagues, whom I very said to, "I can't 
believe that you're a communist." And he is still listed as a communist in terms of his party affiliation. 
25 Joe Slovo was born in Lithuania in 1926 and moved to South Africa with his parents at the age of nine. He 
studied at the University of the Witswatersrand, where he graduated with a BA and LLB degrees. Slovo was an active 
member of the CPSA from the early 1940s and after becoming an advocate at the Johannesburg Bar became well known 
for his work as a defense lawyer in political trails. Along with Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandel a, Slovo formed the High 
Command of the MK. In June 1963 he left the country on an "external mission" and a month later the security forces 
captured the other members of the High Command. Upon their arrest Slovo became commander-in-chief of the MK, a 
position he held until he became general secretary of the SACP in 1987. Slovo moved to Maputo, Mozambique where he 
established an operational base for the ANC. In 1982, his wife, Ruth First, was killed in a parcel-bomb explosion, and in 
1984 Slovo was asked to leave Mozambique after the signing of the Nkomati Accord between that country and South Africa. 
In 1985, Slovo became the ftrst white person to become a member of the ANC' s national executive committee. After the 
ANC and SACP were unbanned, Slovo became one of the ANC' s most important and influential negotiators. He was the 
primary proponent of power sharing for a limited period, arguing its strategic merits on the basis that an ANC majority 
government, new to government, unaware of the clandestine structures of the SAG' s networks of security subworlds, 
unfamiliar with the im1ards of govenm1ent bureaucracrics, dependent on the active cooperation of the civil service for the 
implementation of government policy, too-aware of the civil service's capacity to stymie or even derail government 
initiatives, reliant on state security forces that had been the enforcers of apartheid and were powerful in their own right was 
too susceptible to sabotague from within on the part of the entrenched power structures of the old order, and hence the need 
to coopt them in a govermnent of national unity which would give the ANC time to get a handle on the far-tlung instrunlents 
of government. In the government of national unity, established after the elections of April 1994, Slovo became Minister 
of Housing and one of the most influential members of the cabinet. He died from bone-man·ow cancer in 1995. 
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But otherwise he is as much a free marketeer as anybody else with a capitalistic orientation. 
Politically speaking, I think the structure of the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance is going to be one of 
the more intriguing tests for the ANC. How, for instance, in the next election they will be able to 
explain their economic thinking and compare it with the policies of the SACP while being in an 
alliance with the SACP. I think that will be one of the most interesting questions in the next elections, 
and one that the ANC will have to explain. 
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: Be our guests. [laughter.] 
ROELF MEYER: We're going to enjoy it. On the last question, the question of whether we were 
forced to make agreements. Yes, the threat off the abyss played an important role; the fact that we 
knew there was actually no alternative but to find a negotiated settlement. That was an important 
driving force for all parties. This is why we had to set time limits. 
Lastly, ladies and gentlemen, at the beginning we said, and I want to emphasize, we have definitely 
not come here to try and insinuate that our experience is just like yours, or even that you should try 
and go about resolving it in the same way. 
But if nothing else remains in your minds this evening, I would like to emphasize the following 
again. What we experienced in South Africa's case required a change (?f mind-set to bring about 
negotiations and to bring about a peaceful negotiated settlement. rr we remained stuck in our own 
political thinking, like it used to be, those changes would not have been possible. That concept, that 
message, is applicable under every circumstances wherever you are. In all problematic situations 
where conflict exists, that message is applicable. Not that the substance is always the same, but the 
idea of how to get a process going and keeping it on track is, I believe, essentially the same 
everywhere in the world. 
Thank you very much. [Applause.] 
PADRAIGH O'MALLEY: It's with great regret that I have to draw the formal proceedings to a 
close. I was smiling wryly when I remembered RoelfMeyer's comment earlier that one of the most 
essential things in successful negotiations is setting a deadline and sticking to it. And I thought to 
myself you must have had some very late nights. [laughter.] 
I said the formal proceedings were at an end. However, there is a reception to which you are all 
invited, courtesy oflndependent Newspapers, Ltd., to whom we are deeply grateful for making this 
evening's event possible. 
While I'm on the subject of sponsors, I should add that we are also very deeply indebted to the Center 
for Democracy and Development at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the 
University ofMassachusetts in Boston, who have contributed in equal measure to making this event 
possible. We are very grateful to both. 
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BERNARD CULLEN: We have had an extraordinary session in the last couple of hours. I 
personally don't believe in saintliness, but see examples of it all the time, and we have been witness 
to an example of it this evening, where individuals find the resources within themselves in certain 
difficult circumstances to go further, to go beyond where they ever thought they would go. 
Gentlemen, you have inspired us. You have given us great heart. We congratulate you on your 
achievements. I see some familiar faces of political leaders in the audience. There was some talk 
about the role ofleaders, the role of the grass roots. We all have a responsibility. 
The Irish Association as an organization believes that each one of us has a responsibility, because we 
believe in democracy and we believe that each one of us can go beyond where we thought we ever 
go. And because we believe in democracy we believe that that can have an effect on our political 
leaders, upon whom we depend. 
Gentlemen, we're very grateful to you. Thank you all for coming, ladies and gentlemen. As I said, 
we've had an unforgettable event, something that we will think about and work on and will influence 
our thoughts for many months to come. And I wish you both every success in building the South 
Afiica of your dreams. Sian abhaile, which translated from the Gaelic means 11 a safe journey home, 11 
and don't let it be long until you come back again. [Applause.] 
[END] 
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